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NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES IN THE PROTOCOLS 
ADDITIONAL TO THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPON-
FREE ZONES 
 
Marco Roscini1 
 
[published in H. Gärtner (ed.), Barack Obama’s World Free of Nuclear Weapons: 
Vision or Reality? (Peter Lang, 2011), 129-147] 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Negative security assurances are those guarantees by the nuclear weapon states not to 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states that have renounced them. 
During the negotiations of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), the non-nuclear weapon states sought for security assurances from 
the five nuclear weapon states in return for their renunciation to the military uses of 
nuclear energy. The nuclear weapon states did however not accept the inclusion of 
negative security assurances in the final text of the NPT for fear that their nuclear 
doctrines and alliances could be undermined and limited themselves to subsequently 
make unilateral statements in 1978 and 1995.2 The five treaties establishing nuclear 
weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in inhabited regions, on the contrary, include, inter alia, 
protocols by which the nuclear powers provide legally binding negative security 
assurances to the zonal states.3 Indeed, Paragraph II of Resolution 3472 (XXX) B of 
11 December 1975, in which the General Assembly adopted its definition of NWFZ, 
declares that ‘all nuclear-weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn 
international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a 
convention or a protocol, the following obligations: (a) To respect in all its parts the 
statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which 
serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone; (b) To refrain from contributing in 
any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which 
involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention; (c) To refrain from using or 
threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone’. Paragraph 
                                           
1 Reader in International Law, University of Westminster, London. 
2 In these statements, China was the only nuclear weapon state to offer unconditional assurances. In 
Res. 984 (1995), the UN Security Council took note ‘with appreciation’ of the 1995 statements, which 
superseded those given in 1978. See Roscini, 2003, 301-310. 
3 Five treaties establishing NWFZs have been concluded so far: the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco with 
regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga on the South Pacific Ocean, 
the 1995 Bangkok Treaty with respect to South-East Asia, the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty in relation to 
Africa and the 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on Central Asia. All five treaties have now entered into 
force. 
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62 of the Final Document of the 1978 Tenth Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly, the first special session on disarmament, also states that, with respect to 
NWFZs, ‘the nuclear-weapon States [...] are called upon to give undertakings, the 
modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in 
particular: a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; b) To 
refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the 
zone’.  
In the negotiations that would lead to the establishment of the first NWFZ, it 
was discussed how to formalise these assurances. The Comisión Preparatoria para la 
Denuclearización de América Latina (COPREDAL) supported the adoption of a 
General Assembly resolution endorsing the creation of the zone and binding on all 
states that had voted in favour. The United States, however, doubted that General 
Assembly resolutions could ever acquire binding character and supported the adoption 
of a protocol to be attached to the main treaty, where the obligations of the nuclear 
weapon states would be spelt out (Fischer, 1967, 88). The latter option eventually 
prevailed and was followed by the drafters of the subsequent treaties as well. Negative 
security assurances are thus provided in Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty and in the 
Protocols attached to the Treaties of Bangkok and Semipalatinsk. The importance and 
legally binding character of these assurances have been recognised by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the 
threat and use of nuclear weapons, where it held that a threat or use of nuclear 
weapons should be compatible ‘with the requirements of the international law 
applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and 
other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons’ (ICJ Reports, 1996, 
266): ‘specific obligations under treaties’ can be interpreted as a reference to the 
protocols attached to the NWFZ treaties, while ‘other undertakings’ refers to the 1995 
unilateral statements. 
In the following section, the assurances contained in the NWFZ protocols will 
be discussed, highlighting, where appropriate, the differences among them.4 The 
statements that the nuclear weapon states have formulated on signing and/or ratifying 
the protocols will then be analysed in Section 3 and their nature examined in Section 
4, in order to verify the extent to which they condition the commitments by the 
                                           
4 In Protocol 3 of the Treaty of Rarotonga and Protocol II of the Pelindaba Treaty, the nuclear weapon 
states have also committed not to test nuclear explosive devices within the NWFZs. These no-test 
assurances are however outside the scope of the present study. 
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nuclear weapon states under the protocols. Finally, some considerations on the lights 
and shadows of negative security assurances in the context of NWFZs will be made. 
 
 
2. The Security Assurances Contained in the NWFZ Protocols 
 
Unlike the negative security assurances unilaterally given by the nuclear weapon 
states at the global level to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT (with the 
exception of that of China), the protocols additional to the NWFZ treaties provide not 
only for a commitment not to use nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices,5 but 
also not to threaten their use (Article 3 of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
Article 1 of Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, Article 1 of Protocol I of the 
Pelindaba Treaty, Article 2 of the Bangkok Protocol and Article 1 of the 
Semipalatinsk Protocol). In the protocols attached to the Treaties of Rarotonga, 
Pelindaba, Bangkok and Semipalatinsk, this two-pronged commitment is undertaken 
by the five nuclear weapon states under the NPT, i.e. China, France, Russian 
Federation, United Kingdom and United States. Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, on the contrary, does not expressly refer to them, which would allow de 
facto nuclear powers like India and Pakistan to accede the protocol (Gros Espiell, 
1973, 324). 
The beneficiaries of the negative security assurances are those states that, by 
ratifying the relevant regional treaty, have become part of a NWFZ. The protocols 
attached to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba expressly extend the assurances 
to the territories situated within the zone but for which an external state is 
internationally responsible. Such extension does not appear in the protocols attached 
to the Treaties of Bangkok and Semipalatinsk, as no territory within these zones is 
controlled by external states. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, where 
United States, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands still control territories, 
the lacuna has been filled by the statements issued by the nuclear powers on signing 
and/or ratifying Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, by which they have accepted 
to extend the assurances to the dependent territories situated within the zone.6 These 
amount to unilateral commitments by which the author ‘purports to undertake 
obligations going beyond those imposed on it by the treaty’.7 If the requirements 
                                           
5 The broader notion of ‘nuclear explosive device’ is used in the Rarotonga, Pelindaba and 
Semipalatinsk Protocols. On its meaning, see Roscini, 2003, 37-42. 
6 Read the statements at <http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf>. 
7 International Law Commission (ILC) guideline 1.4.1. In Res. 48/31 of 9 December 1993, the UN 
General Assembly requested the ILC to study the topic of reservations to treaties. The purpose is not to 
draft a treaty, but rather to prepare guidelines with commentaries and model clauses that states and 
international organisations can use whenever they intend to append a reservation. The text of the 
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indicated by the ICJ in its 1974 judgment on the Nuclear Tests case are met,8 they 
become binding on those who make them. 
The Bangkok Protocol is peculiar in that it prohibits the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states not only against the states parties to the 
treaty, but also ‘within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone’. This entails a 
commitment by the nuclear weapon states not to launch missiles with a nuclear 
warhead from ships, submarines or aircraft located within the zone even if the target is 
situated outside, and also not to use nuclear weapons against means of transport (even 
if they belong to another nuclear weapon state) situated in the internal waters, 
territorial sea and, most importantly, exclusive economic zone of the states parties to 
the Bangkok Treaty.9 A regional state could also benefit from the negative security 
assurances if its territory is included in the geographical scope of application of the 
Bangkok Treaty, regardless of whether or not it has ratified or withdrawn from it 
(Biad, 1997, 232). For these reasons, the United States has so far refused to sign the 
protocol (Yakemtchouk, 1997, 55). A similar position has been taken by France 
(Bourgois, 1997, 126). 
It is not clear whether the negative security assurances provided in the protocols 
also apply to those denuclearised states that possess other weapons of mass 
destruction, i.e. chemical and biological weapons: the fact that the undertakings do not 
apply ‘under any circumstances’, as for instance in Article I (1) of the 1993 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, appears to support a negative answer. 
With regard to Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty, the Special Assistant for Arms 
Control to the US President expressly declared that ‘Protocol I will not limit options 
available to the United States in response to an attack by an African Nuclear 
Weapons-Free Zone party using weapons of mass destruction’ (quoted in Rosen, 
1997-1998, 51-52). United Kingdom, United States and France all oppose a no-first 
use policy and admit the use of nuclear weapons in belligerent reprisal against those 
                                                                                                                        
guidelines provisionally adopted by the Commission can be read in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its sixty-first session (4 May – 5 June and 6 July – 7 August 2009), UN 
Doc. A/64/10, Supplement No. 10, 191 et seq. 
8 According to the ICJ, ‘[i]t is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, 
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. […] When it is 
the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, 
that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth 
legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this 
kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of 
international negotiations is binding’ (ICJ Reports, 1974, 267). 
9 According to Art. 1 of the Bangkok Treaty, the South-East Asia NWFZ also includes the continental 
shelves and exclusive economic zones of the states parties. 
 5
states using chemical or biological weapons (Yost, 2006, 702).10 The French nuclear 
deterrence doctrine announced by former President Chirac in 2006, for instance, 
threatens nuclear retaliation against those ‘who would envisage using, in one way or 
another, weapons of mass destruction’ (quoted in Yost, 2006, 702). The 2010 US 
Nuclear Posture Review, as to it, on the one hand declares that states benefiting from 
US revised negative security assurances and using chemical or biological weapons 
against the United States and its allies and partners would face a ‘devastating 
conventional military response’, but on the other it emphasises that ‘the United States 
reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by 
the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapon threat and the U.S. capacities 
to counter that threat’ (US Nuclear Posture Review, 2010, 16; emphasis added).  
Consistently with the above mentioned General Assembly Resolution 3472, the 
NWFZ protocols contain not only non-use commitments, but also other types of 
assurances. By ratifying the Bangkok Protocol, the nuclear weapon states undertake 
‘not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocol 
by States Parties to them’ (Article 1). The Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk Protocols use 
similar language (Article 2), while the Pelindaba and Tlatelolco Protocols do not 
specify that the violations must be committed by the other states parties (Article 2). 
However, this does not seem to have practical consequences, as it is only the parties to 
the relevant instrument that could ‘violate’ it according to the principle pacta tertiis 
nec nocent nec prosunt codified in Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. To be on the safe side, though, on signing and ratifying the Pelindaba 
Protocols, the United Kingdom made clear that the commitment is to be interpreted as 
meaning that ‘each party undertakes not to contribute to any act of a party to the 
Treaty which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or to any act of another party to a 
Protocol which constitute a violation of that Protocol’.11 
Finally, the protocols attached to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Bangkok also 
contain ‘status assurances’ (Rosas, 1982, 199), i.e. a commitment to respect the 
denuclearisation of the concerned region (Article 1 in both protocols). This amounts 
to an obligation not to introduce nuclear weapons in the NWFZ. According to China 
and the Soviet Union, though, this undertaking also entails the prohibition of transit 
and overflight for ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.12 
                                           
10 In his Dissenting Opinion on the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, Judge Schwebel 
recalled that ‘[a]s long as […] “rogue states” menace the world (whether they are or are not parties to 
the NPT), it would be imprudent to set policy on the basis that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is 
unlawful “in any circumstance”. Indeed, it may not only be the rogue States but criminals or fanatics 
whose threats or acts of terrorism conceivably may require a nuclear deterrent or response’ (ICJ 
Reports, 1996, 329). 
11 See <http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf>. 
12 See below, Section 4. 
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3. The Statements Formulated by the Nuclear Weapon States on Signing and/or 
Ratifying the NWFZ Protocols 
 
To protect their security interests, on signing and/or ratifying the protocols additional 
to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Ratogonga and Pelindaba the nuclear weapon states have 
formulated certain statements the nature of which is unclear. Some parts of these 
statements concern the negative security assurances.13 On signing Protocol II of the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States declared that, with regard to its commitment 
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zonal states, it ‘would have 
to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a 
nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s 
corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty’.14 ‘Assistance’ is however 
not defined, so one can wonder whether it covers only direct participation in the 
armed attack or also, say, logistical or financial support. Furthermore, in the absence 
of any specification, it is irrelevant whether the nuclear weapon state assisting the 
state party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in carrying out the armed attack actually uses 
nuclear weapons or not: the point can however be made that the (military) assistance 
of a nuclear weapon state always implies the threat and the potential use of nuclear 
weapons. The statement issued by the United Kingdom on signing Protocol II to the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco and confirmed at the moment of ratification is very similar to that 
of the United States. The only significant difference is the reference not to ‘armed 
attack’ but to ‘act of aggression’, which is a broader concept: the UK assurance is thus 
narrower than the American one. It is not clear whether a case of ‘indirect’ aggression 
carried out by a state party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco with the support of a nuclear 
weapon state would also allow the United Kingdom to reconsider its undertaking.15 
The Soviet Union, as to it, formulated a declaration on signing Protocol II invoking 
                                           
13 The statements can be read in the on line treaty database of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 
<http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf>. See also SIPRI Yearbook, 2010, 495-497, 
499, 500-501. This study will only examine those parts of the statements related to the negative 
security assurances. 
14 The statement was confirmed on ratifying the protocol. According to a commentator, ‘the purpose of 
the US declaration is to encompass those hypothetical contingencies in which nuclear weapons are 
neither acquired by Contracting Parties nor introduced into their territories but in which a nuclear-
weapon State assisted a Contracting Party in an armed attack by providing a “nuclear umbrella” or 
conventional armed support’ (Shaker, 1980, Vol. II, 512). The reasons that persuaded the United States 
to give negative security assurances to the Latin American states are highlighted by Bunn, 1997, 5. 
15 ‘Indirect’ aggression has been defined in the well-known UN General Assembly’s Definition of 
Aggression as ‘[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to 
the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein’ (GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 
1974, Art. 3 (g)). 
 7
the right to review its obligations towards the zonal states in case of: 1) ‘[a]ny action 
taken by one or more States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that is incompatible 
with its non-nuclear status’; 2) ‘the commission by one or more States parties to the 
Treaty of an act of aggression in support of a nuclear-weapon State or jointly with that 
State’; and 3) ‘any action on the part of other nuclear-weapon States’ incompatible 
with their obligations under Protocol II.16 With regard to (1), the Soviet statement 
explains that the granting by a denuclearised state of the permission for the transit of 
nuclear weapons ‘in any form’ through the zone would be an action incompatible with 
its denuclearisation obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco: this action 
would thus entitle the Soviet Union (now Russia)17 to reconsider its commitments.18 
France formulated a declaration at the signature of Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco stating that the negative security assurances under Article 3 of the Protocol 
do not prejudice the full exercise of the right of self-defence as provided in Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations.19 The French statement should be read as a 
reaffirmation of the right to use nuclear weapons in self-defence: if interpreted as 
referring only to conventional weapons, the statement’s reference to Article 3 of 
Protocol II would not make sense. The invocation of the ‘full’ exercise of the right of 
self-defence also supports this interpretation. Finally, the Chinese statement issued on 
signing Protocol II limits itself to reaffirm China’s position on nuclear disarmament, 
its opposition to the NPT and to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and its 
commitment to ‘never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone’: China 
was then the only nuclear weapon state to give an unconditional assurance. 
In relation to Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, the United Kingdom 
declared that the negative security assurances would not apply in the case of ‘an 
invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its 
armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security 
commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the Treaty in association or 
alliance with a nuclear weapon State’ or ‘if a party to the Treaty is in material breach 
of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty’.20 ‘Invasion’ and ‘security 
                                           
16 The statement was reiterated at the moment of ratification. 
17 As from 24 December 1991, the Russian Federation continues to exercise the rights and honour the 
commitments arising from treaties concluded by the Soviet Union. 
18 On this point, see below, Section 4. 
19 The statement was reiterated at the moment of ratification. 
20 The declaration is modelled on that given to NPT non-nuclear weapon states on 6 April 1995. 
According to Art. 60 (3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a ‘material breach’ is 
‘(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty’. The statement does 
not stipulate who is entitled to determine whether the denuclearised state is in material breach of its 
obligations. 
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commitment’ are not legal terms of art and have therefore no definition in 
international law. Furthermore, the difference between ‘association’ and ‘alliance’ is 
unclear. The latter seems to refer to the case where there is a treaty of alliance in force 
between the denuclearised and the nuclear weapon states, while in the former ‘there’s 
no piece of paper’ (Bunn, 1997, 15). From a literal interpretation of the statement, 
however, it seems that the mere existence of a treaty of alliance would not allow the 
United Kingdom to reconsider its non-use commitment if the other nuclear weapon 
state did not participate in it. At the moment of the signature of Protocol 2 of the 
Treaty of Rarotonga, the Soviet Union issued a statement similar to that related to 
Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco but with a few differences: the reference to 
violations of the protocol by the parties to the protocol disappears and a distinction is 
made between two groups of situations: in case of any action undertaken by a state 
party to the Treaty of Rarotonga which is not compatible with its ‘main’ commitments 
under the treaty and in case of an act of aggression with the support of or jointly with 
a state in possession of nuclear weapons with the use by such a state of the territory, 
airspace, territorial sea or archipelagic waters of the treaty parties for calls by nuclear 
armed ships or aircraft or for transit of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would 
consider itself free from its obligations under Protocol 2, while in case of any other 
actions by the states parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga incompatible with their non-
nuclear status the Soviet Union reserves the right to reconsider its commitments.21 
The Chinese declaration on signing Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga is much 
more restrictive than that formulated in relation to Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, as it states that China reserves the right to reconsider its obligations 
towards the zonal states if other nuclear weapon states or the contracting parties take 
any action in gross violation of the treaty or its protocols that changes the nuclear-free 
status of the zone and endangers China’s security. This statement was however not 
confirmed at the moment of ratification. On signing Protocol 2 of the Treaty of 
Rarotonga, France made the usual reference to the full exercise of the right of self-
defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and declared that the commitments 
towards the zonal states were the same as those unilaterally given in 1995 to the NPT 
non-nuclear weapon states and of which Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) took 
note. The US government signed Protocol 2 without reservations (Goldblat, 1997, 24). 
The statements formulated by United States, United Kingdom, Russian 
Federation and France on signing Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty are modelled on 
the negative security assurances given at the global level to the NPT non-nuclear 
                                           
21 The statement was not reiterated at the moment of ratification. Among the actions incompatible with 
the non-nuclear status of the zonal states, the Soviet statement includes the granting of permission for 
the transit of nuclear explosive devices in any form through the zone and for calls at the ports and 
airfields within the zone of ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board. 
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weapon states in 1995 and provide that the non-use commitments will not apply in 
case of an invasion or any other attack against the nuclear weapon states, their 
territories, armed forces or other troops, their allies, or on a state towards which they 
have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the NWFZ treaty in 
association or alliance with another nuclear weapon state. Consistently with the 
statement made in relation to Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, however, the 
United Kingdom added a further case in which it would reconsider its commitments, 
i.e. when a state party to the treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation 
obligations under the treaty: to benefit from the assurance, then, the zonal states need 
not only to adhere to the treaty, but also to comply with it. The United Kingdom also 
pointed out that it does not accept the inclusion of the British Indian Ocean Territory 
within the African NWFZ without its consent and that therefore it does not accept any 
legal obligations in respect to that territory arising from its adherence to Protocols I 
and II. This claim was opposed in the Russian statement, according to which, as 
certain states declared to consider themselves free from obligations arising from the 
protocols with respect to the above mentioned territory, Russia would also not be 
bound by its undertakings under Article 1 of Protocol I in respect to it. 
No nuclear weapon state has so far either signed or ratified the protocols 
attached to the Bangkok and Semipalatinsk Treaties. In particular, China has objected 
to the Bangkok Treaty because of the inclusion in the zone of certain parts of the 
South China Sea the sovereignty of which is contested (Goldblat, 1997, 28). The US 
government, as to it, is concerned that restrictions on air and maritime transit rights 
might arise from the inclusion in the zone of the exclusive economic zones of the 
states parties and that regional security arrangements might be disturbed 
(Yakemtchouk, 1997, 55). The United States has also not supported the Central Asian 
NWFZ for fear that Iran might join and use its membership to hide its clandestine 
nuclear programme and because Article 12 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty preserves the 
rights and obligations of the states parties under pre-existing treaties, which might 
allow Russia to redeploy its nuclear weapons in the region (SIPRI Yearbook, 2010, 
399-400).22 
 
 
4. The Legal Nature of the Statements Formulated by the Nuclear Weapon States: 
Reservations or Interpretative Declarations? 
 
                                           
22 The draft clause envisaging potential extension of membership was however deleted. I have also 
argued elsewhere that the importance of Art. 12 should not be overestimated (Roscini, 2008, 598-599). 
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If the protocols attached to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba are silent on 
reservations, with the consequence that only those incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty are prohibited (Article 19 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties), Article 4 of Protocol II additional to the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
prohibits all reservations.23 During the fourth session of COPREDAL, the Mexican 
delegate Castañeda clarified that ‘[a] juicio de su Delegación, la prohibición de hacer 
reservas no incluía la posibilidad de hacer declaraciones interpretativas que no 
tuvieran jurídicamente el carácter de reservas’ (COPREDAL/AR/41, 1967, 15). The 
problem is, thus, whether the statements related to Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco analysed in the previous section amount to reservations or to mere 
interpretative declarations: in the former case, they would be impermissible and they 
might prejudice the participation of the reserving state to the Latin American 
denuclearisation regime.24 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not deal with 
interpretative declarations. In Article 13 (l) of his draft articles on the law of treaties, 
the Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice suggested that reservations do not include ‘mere 
statements as to how the State concerned proposed to implement the treaty, or 
declarations of understanding or interpretation, unless these imply a variation on the 
substantive terms or effect of the treaty’ (Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1956, Vol. II, 110). In his First Report (1962), Fitzmaurice’s successor, 
Sir Humphrey Waldock, limited himself to incorporate a provision in the draft articles 
(Article 1 (l)) according to which ‘[a]n explanatory statement or statement of intention 
or of understanding as to the meaning of the treaty, which does not amount to a 
variation in the legal effect of the treaty, does not constitute a reservation’ (Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, 1962, Vol. II, 31-32). These provisions were 
eventually not included in the final text of the Vienna Convention, which only 
contains the definition of ‘reservation’ (‘unilateral statement, however phrased or 
named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to 
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’).25 
An interpretative declaration is however defined in the ILC draft guidelines on 
reservations to treaties as a ‘unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by 
a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization 
purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a 
                                           
23 According to Art. 4, the prohibition of reservations contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco applies to 
the protocol as well. 
24 A reservation prohibited by the treaty prevents the accession of the reserving state to the treaty unless 
the reservation is withdrawn or is unanimously accepted by the other contracting states (Horn, 1988, 
119-120). 
25 Article 2 (1) (d). 
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treaty or to certain of its provisions’ (draft guideline 1.2). Unlike reservations, then, 
interpretative declarations have the limited purpose of clarifying the scope and 
meaning of a treaty, and not of excluding or modifying its legal effects: the declarant 
state merely gives its interpretation of an ambiguous provision after the treaty has 
been adopted, with no derogatory effect (Bowett, 1976-1977, 88-89).26 In order to 
determine whether it is a reservation or an interpretative declaration, one has to 
interpret the statement in good faith taking into account the ordinary meaning of the 
terms in the light of the treaty to which it refers and of the intention of the declarant at 
the time it formulated the statement (draft guideline 1.3.1).  
There are several differences in the rules and procedures applicable to 
reservations and interpretative declarations. Unlike reservations, interpretative 
declarations can be formulated at any time unless the treaty provides otherwise (draft 
guideline 2.4.3). When formulated on signing a treaty, they do not need subsequent 
confirmation when the state expresses its consent to be bound (draft guideline 2.4.4), 
unless they are ‘conditional’ interpretative declarations (draft guideline 2.4.5). If a 
state objects to a reservation, it must do so within ‘twelve months after it was notified 
of the reservation or by the date in which it expressed its consent to be bound by the 
treaty, whichever is later’ (Article 20 (5) of the Vienna Convention) otherwise the 
reservation will be considered as accepted, while, according to draft guideline 2.9.9, 
‘[a]n approval of an interpretative declaration shall not be inferred from the mere 
silence of a State or international organization’. The declarant state will therefore have 
to demonstrate that the silence of the other party is relevant to determine whether that 
party has approved the interpretative declaration.27 The effects of an objection are also 
different depending on whether it refers to a reservation or to an interpretative 
declaration. In the latter case, the objection (rectius: opposition) only entails the 
insurgence of an interpretative dispute between parties without effects on the 
application of the treaty between them, while in the former the objection prevents the 
application of the provision to which the reservation relates between the reserving and 
the objecting states (Article 21 (3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention). 
In light of the above, are the statements formulated by the nuclear weapon states 
on signing and/or ratifying Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco reservations or 
interpretative declarations? The wording of the French statement seems to suggest that 
it is an interpretative declaration and not a reservation (‘The French Government 
interprets’, ‘this interpretative declaration by the French Government’). The 
                                           
26 According to another commentator, an interpretative declaration ‘has the function to assert the 
existence and contents of a norm where the text of the treaty leaves us in doubt. It is not intended to 
have a derogatory effect, which is the case with reservations’ (Horn, 1988, 237-238). 
27 As explained by Lysén, ‘[t]he state invoking a reservation only has to show inaction by other states 
(i.e. tacit acceptance). For an interpretative declaration, on the other hand, it is a matter of showing 
acquiescence in the declaration by the confronted states’ (Lysén, 1990, 168). 
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terminology employed does not however have a decisive importance, as the declarant 
state might use misleading language in order to circumvent the express prohibition of 
reservations contained in a treaty.28 One has rather to look at the effects on the 
concerned provision, i.e. whether the statement aims to modify its legal effects or 
merely to clarify certain ambiguous aspects of it. It does not seem that the French 
statement entails any modification of the legal effects of Article 3 of Protocol II of the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco: indeed, even though the protocol does not expressly refer to it, 
the inherent right of self-defence would have been preserved anyway and, according 
to the ICJ, such right could be exercised through the use of nuclear weapons, though 
only in ‘extreme circumstances’ where the state’s survival is at stake (ICJ Reports, 
1996, 263).29 The French statement is then not a reservation, but a ‘conditional’ 
interpretative declaration, as the declarant ‘subjects its consent to be bound by the 
treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty or of certain provisions thereof’ (ILC 
draft guideline 1.2.1).30 A conditional interpretative declaration is, at the same time, 
an interpretation of the provision and a potential reservation: when a different 
interpretation becomes authoritative, the declaration becomes a real reservation and 
objections will have to be issued within twelve months from the date when the 
authoritative interpretation has been affirmed (Horn, 1988, 242). 
It has been seen that the statements formulated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Soviet Union in relation to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
reaffirm the right to reconsider the negative security assurances in case the 
denuclearised states carry out an armed attack or an act of aggression with the support 
or assistance of or jointly with a nuclear weapon state and, in the Soviet Union’s 
statement, also if a denuclearised state adopts measures incompatible with its status or 
if another party to the protocol adopts measures incompatible with its obligations 
under the protocol. These too are interpretative declarations and not reservations, as 
they limit themselves to reaffirm the customary principle inadimplenti non est 
adimplendum, as codified in Article 60 (2) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. This conclusion is however valid only if the above statements are 
interpreted narrowly, i.e. as suspending the negative security assurances solely when a 
                                           
28 According to ILC draft guideline 1.3.2, the phrasing and name of the statement is only an indication 
of its nature. 
29 This is confirmed by the Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All 
Its Aspects (Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament), UN Doc. 
A/10027/Add. 1, New York, 1976, Annex II, para. 155 (‘a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty cannot 
impair the inherent right, under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’). 
30 The French declaration states that ‘[i]f the interpretative declaration thus made by the French 
Government is contested in whole or in part by one or more Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to 
Protocol II, the said instruments shall be without effect in relations between the French Republic and 
the contesting State or States’. 
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nuclear weapon state directly and militarily supports a denuclearised state in the 
armed attack or aggression (not just provides financial or logistic assistance) and as 
envisaging the threat or use of nuclear weapons only when it is proportionate to the 
armed attack or aggression carried out by the denuclearised state with the support of a 
nuclear weapon state. 
The Soviet statement, however, raises serious problems where it claims that 
granting permission for the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone ‘in any form’ 
would be incompatible with the denuclearised states’ obligations under Article 1 of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco and would thus entitle the Soviet Union to reconsider its 
commitments under Protocol II. The treaty is silent on transit, but COPREDAL took 
the position that, in the absence of express provisions in the treaty, the principles and 
rules of international law apply, which entail the right of the territorial state to decide 
in each case whether to authorise the transit or not (García Robles, 1967, 247-248). 
The Soviet Union and its continuator, the Russian Federation, have always considered 
themselves parties to the Tlatelolco Protocol and as such they have been treated by the 
treaty parties and by the depositary government, that did not object to the statement: it 
seems that, at least for them, the statement did not amount to an impermissible 
reservation. This conclusion is supported by a study prepared by the US Department 
of State Legal Adviser’s Office, according to which the Soviet declaration is nothing 
else than a ‘political statement of opposition to such transit’ and, as such, it ‘has no 
validity or effect’ (quoted in Horn, 1988, 447). It appears, then, that the other parties 
and the depositary government have acquiesced to the Soviet statement, which has 
allowed the Soviet Union’s participation in the denuclearisation of Latin America.31 
As to the Chinese declaration, it amounts to what the ILC calls ‘general 
statements of policy’, that are neither reservations nor interpretative declarations and 
that can be formulated at any time (draft guideline 1.4.4).32 Indeed, China limited 
itself to reaffirm its no-first use policy and its opposition to the NPT and PTBT. The 
declaration does not have a specific link to the protocol and does not aim to modify its 
effects or to interpret its provisions. It is not surprising, then, that China was the only 
nuclear power not to reiterate its declaration at the moment of the ratification of 
Protocol II. 
                                           
31 One could also recall the ILC draft guideline 1.3.3 providing that ‘[w]hen a treaty prohibits 
reservations to all or certain of its provisions, a unilateral statement formulated in respect thereof by a 
State or an international organization shall be presumed not to constitute a reservation except when it 
purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a 
whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application to its author’. 
32 Draft guideline 1.4.4 reads as follows: ‘A unilateral statement formulated by a State or by an 
international organization whereby that State or that organization expresses its views on a treaty or on 
the subject matter covered by the treaty, without purporting to produce a legal effect on the treaty, 
constitutes a general statement of policy which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice’. 
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The problem of the nature of the statements formulated by the nuclear weapon 
states in relation to the Rarotonga and Pelindaba Protocols is not of paramount 
importance, as the prohibition of reservations that applies to the main treaties is not 
extended to the protocols as in the Tlatelolco regime. No particular problems arise, 
then, from the Soviet statement issued on 15 December 1986 on signing Protocols 2 
and 3 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, according to which the permission of transit of 
nuclear explosive devices in any form through the zone and the calls at the ports and 
airfields within the zone of ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board is ‘in 
conflict with the aims of the Treaty and incompatible with the nuclear-free status of 
the zone’ and would thus allow the Soviet Union to reconsider its commitments under 
Protocol 2. If – as seen above - in the context of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its 
protocols the nature of such statement is dubious, in the Rarotonga regime it certainly 
amounts to a reservation, as the treaty contains a provision expressly reaffirming the 
right of each party to decide for itself whether to authorise or not the passage of 
nuclear ships and aircraft (Article 5 (2)), the legal effects of which the Soviet 
statement aims to exclude. The statement was however not confirmed at the moment 
of ratification, which means that the Russian Federation is now bound without 
reservations. 
 
 
5. Negative Security Assurances and NWFZs: An Evaluation 
 
The main advantage of the negative security assurances contained in the protocols 
additional to the NWFZ treaties is that, unlike those provided unilaterally at the global 
level to the NPT non-nuclear weapon states parties, they are legally binding, even 
though the nuclear weapon states have attached exceptions and conditions to them. 
The problem is that several nuclear powers still have to sign or ratify the protocols: 
the United States has to ratify the Rarotonga and Pelindaba Protocols, Russia has 
signed but not ratified Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty and no nuclear weapon state 
has so far signed or ratified the Bangkok and Semipalatinsk Protocols.33 At the NPT 
Review Conference of May 2010, though, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
announced that the US government will seek Senate advice and consent to ratification 
of the Rarotonga and Pelindaba Protocols.34 This is because ‘the [US] Administration 
                                           
33 The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference stressed ‘the importance of the signature 
and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to the 
treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones’, called the concerned states on ratifying the protocols 
and encouraged them ‘to review any related reservations’ (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June 2010, 
16, 22). 
34 ‘Secretary Clinton’s Remarks at NPT Review Conference’, 3 May 2010, 
<www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100504083001bpuh7.084292e-02.html>. 
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is satisfied that the African and South Pacific treaties are consistent with U.S. and 
international criteria for such zones’ and that ‘the Treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga 
and their Protocols will not disturb existing security arrangements or U.S. military 
operations, installations, or activities’. The treaties and protocols will also ‘promote 
regional cooperation, security and stability and provide a vehicle for the extension of 
legally-binding negative security assurances, consistent with the strengthened 
negative security assurance announced in the recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’.35 
As to the Bangkok and Semipalatinsk Protocols, Clinton declared that the US 
government is willing to continue consultations with the zonal states in order to 
eventually ratify the instruments. The Russian President Medvedev has also recently 
sent the Pelindaba Protocols to the Duma to consider ratification.36  
It should however not be forgotten that, with the exception of Protocol II of the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NWFZ protocols are not open for signature to de facto 
nuclear weapon states not parties to the NPT and that only India has unilaterally 
declared that ‘it fully respects the status of the NWFZ in South-East Asia’, is ‘ready to 
convert this commitment into a legal obligation’ and ‘remains responsive to the 
expressed need for such commitments from other nuclear-weapon-free zones also’ 
(Prawitz, 2000, 33). Furthermore, even if all nuclear weapon states ratified the 
protocols, the negative security assurances would still be reversible: the protocols are 
of a permanent nature, but the parties can withdraw whenever ‘extraordinary events’ 
related to the subject-matter of the protocols jeopardise their ‘supreme interests’.37 No 
mechanism to review the party’s decision to withdraw is provided: the withdrawing 
                                           
35 U.S. Department of State, Press Release 2010/557, 3 May 2010, 
<http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/141415.htm>. In the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review, 
the US government committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapons states parties to the NPT in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations (US Nuclear 
Posture Review, 2010, 15). As to countries possessing nuclear weapons or not in compliance with their 
non-proliferation obligations, ‘there remain a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear 
weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW [chemical or biological weapon] 
attack against the United States or its allies and partners’, i.e. ‘in extreme circumstances to defend the 
vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners’ (ibid., 16). The Final Document of the 2010 
NPT Review Conference welcomed the ‘statements by some nuclear-weapon States regarding 
measures related to strengthening negative security assurances’ (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June 
2010, 14). The Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO also recommended that 
‘NATO should endorse a policy of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations’ (NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and 
Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 17 May 2010, at 43 
(<www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf >)). 
36 See ‘Russia to Weigh African Nuke-Free Protocols’, Global Security Newswire, 25 August 2010, 
<http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100825_1465.php>. 
37 Art. 4 of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Art. 6 of Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, Art. 
6 of Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty, Art. 5 of the Protocol attached to the Bangkok Treaty, Art. 6 of 
the Protocol of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. Art. 4 of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which 
invokes Art. 31 of the treaty, refers to ‘circumstances’ instead of ‘extraordinary events’ and adds the 
‘peace and security’ of the contracting parties to their ‘supreme interests’. 
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party is only required to notify the ‘extraordinary events’ jeopardizing its supreme 
interests. Even though the other parties could question the existence of such 
extraordinary events, the lack of any definition and the vagueness of the notions 
hardly make this notification obligation an effective deterrent against the frivolous 
exercise of the right of withdrawal. 
Finally, no NWFZ protocol provides for an effective enforcement mechanism to 
react to violations by the nuclear weapon states of their undertakings under the 
protocols. The Bangkok Treaty limits itself to provide that, in case of a breach of the 
protocol by a state party to it, the Executive Committee set up by the treaty ‘shall 
convene a special meeting of the Commission [for the Southeast Asia NWFZ] to 
decide on appropriate measures to be taken’ (Article 14 (4) of the Bangkok Treaty). 
Potential remedies will then have to be found in the framework of competent 
international organisations and of general international law. As to the former, non-
military sanctions could be adopted and the UN Security Council could also step in if 
the situation amounts to a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression 
(Article 39 of the UN Charter). With regard to the latter, the states parties might adopt 
countermeasures against the wrongdoing state according to the law of state 
responsibility.38 
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